Introduction

In its history, religion has never been a tool of political resistance except for several narratives such as the effect of arbitration between Mu'awwiyah and Ali's followers. This radical movement was successfully crushed through political stabilization by the Ummayyah dynasty. In the expansion process, the preference that develops is political narrative, not religion. Radicalism in Islam only emerged after Islam came into contact with Western education. The Muslims became aware that they were being colonized and needed independence (Ali, 1995). The consistent narrative of fundamentalism is that everything that comes from the West has the potential to become a threat, so Muslims must take firm and tough action.

Azyumardi Azra says that the State applies a soft and accommodating political system to modern Islamic movements in Indonesia. By continuing to prioritize clear boundaries in thinking and acting for these movements. Therefore, even though there are actually many individuals and modern religious movements in Indonesia that are radical, the State faces them with a gentle, appreciative and accommodating approach (Azra, 2007).

Power is not always synonymous with hegemony as described by Antonio Gramsci (Bates, 1975). Power has many approaches in its implementation. The state's handling of Islamic movements takes various forms, such as inclusion, subordination, patron-client relations, and agent-structure as thought by Giddens, Bourdieu and Archer. According to Michael Foucault, power is not a kind of ownership system, it is not repressive (Foucault, 1982). According to him, power can apply in various ways. Power is adjusted according to various disciplinary strategies so that normality occurs (Green, 2010)

In realizing this normality, the powerful Government in the period of the Dutch East Indies, Japanese Occupation, Old Order, New Order and Post-Reformation, Indonesia implemented normalization in the form of soft power against the powerless Islamic movement. This article aims to measure the degree (gradation) of the soft-power application of the government in those periods. The focus of its case in each period was: First, how the Dutch East Indies handled the Padri troops and the establishment of many modern Islamic movements. Second, how the Japanese Occupation organized the Islamic movement. Third, how did the Old Order deal with the potential for fundamentalism by Masjumi in the Constituent Assembly and their attitude towards modernist Muslim intelligence? Fourth, how the New Order handled the modernists of former Masjumi members and Fifth, how the potential for radicalism was overcome in the Post Reformation. The indicator is the government's attitude in handling, compensating or contributing to the existence of the Islamic movement.

Methodology

Apart from bringing up the idea of independence, radicalism has also made Muslims aware that Islam as their religion and belief has been left backward compared to the advances that have been made by the West. This realization led Muslim intellectuals to take action in different ways. Some responded to the decline of Islam with reformist movements, some with conservatives and some with violent means. The group that chooses tough methods is known as the radical group (Muzakki, 2014).

Radicalism is a notion that wants the changes by violence or extremes. They want the changes in a short time. This method can conflict with the on going social system. Radicalism is synonymous with terrorism because they make changes by spreading terror to anyone who is considered to be a nuisance and hinders the changes they want. One of the important features of radicalism is that it considers people whose views differ from them as guilty. Without much consideration, they immediately paralyze people who disagree with them in a harsh and cruel way (Ramakrishna, 2009).

Anzar Abdullah said that even though it is a term made by the West to designate Islam as its subject, radical actions in Islam have existed for a long time. Khawarij is a radical school because it fulfills radical criteria. They claim beliefs that are different from theirs are heretical. They force the other side to follow what they believe. Khawarij also committed violence to achieve his wishes (Nasution, 2018; Sukring, 2016). Radicalism has the potential to commit terrorism. Adherents of this view generally interpret authoritative texts in a very literalistic manner. They suspect various forms of renewal. They demanded that the Muslims apply ideas that are understood literally from authoritative texts. According to them, Islam which has been mixed with various forms of modernity is heretical. Islam must be positioned in a very pure position (Emmanuel Sivan).

Radical ideology has been practiced by the Khawarij group. They claimed that Ali and Muawwiyah had become kafir because they did not observe Allah's law. A literalistic and rigid mind set in understanding texts is a characteristic of Khawarij (Nasution, 2018). This characteristic can be a basic barometer to say someone or a group is a radicalist. Radicalism in modern times occurs as a reaction against Western colonialism. They want to reject Western principles which are considered literalistically as a challenge to Islam (Azra, 1999).

The radical ideology in religion should not be a big problem in Indonesia (Miswari, 2018). The reason is that this radicalism emerged from a literalistic perspective which is unique to the Arabian (Schoun, 1995). The people of the archipelago have historically had a tradition of flexible understanding of religion. Islam in Indonesia can "negotiate" well with the social context of the archipelago which is full of cultural uniqueness and beauty. In Indonesia, Islam is able to see the essence of culture and the essence of religion as a whole, which is different only in the approach and actuality of implementation (Nasution & Miswari, 2017). In short, the character of Indonesian is different from Arabian, which is the birth place and development of radical religious methods (Arifin Mansurnoor, 1992; Muzakki, 2014).

Indonesian society realizes that culture is a solution to solve life's problems. Cultural practices in Indonesia have never been seen as inconsistent with religious principles and practices (Mansurnoor, 2018). Religion and culture can live in harmony in Indonesia. The public is aware that religion is the same as culture; it presents to provide direction, guidance and life spirit. The religion and culture are seen as providing convenience and beauty in life (Uhi, 2016).

The birth of Pancasila (The Five Principles) as the basis of the state shows the breadth and depth of life perspective of the Indonesian people (Latif, 2015). The Pancasila discusses the basic foundation of humanity. This foundation is the same as the basic principles of Islam. In its deepest reflection, the Indonesian people realize that God is a Single Reality, justice is the foundation of humanity, unity and united are realized realities, wisdom is the benchmarks of social integration, and social justice is a balance to the life of the nation and the state of these principles as well is the essence of religion (Latif, 2018).

During the period from the Dutch East Indies to the Post-Reformation, Indonesia adopted different approaches in dealing with society. The approach taken adapts to the situation and needs. The goal remains for social stability. Islamic movements, especially radical Islamic movements, also received different treatment in each period of government (Kuntowijoyo, 2004). Each period has a different way of dealing with the actions of the Islamic movement. In general, it can be said that all of these periods applied accommodative politics in dealing with Islamic movements (Azra, 2007). But each period, as powerful state, it has a different level of accommodation in each period in dealing with the Islamic movement as powerless (Foucault, 1982).

Results and Discussion

Dutch Indies Handling Padri and the Development of Modernism

In general, modernism in Indonesia and the Islamic world was a reaction against colonialism launched by Europe against Eastern countries (Ali, 1995). Awareness of oppression and occupation made the Muslim ummah arise from the education introduced by the West. So the actors of Islamic modernization are those who have had contact with Western education (Azra, 2007).

Modernization occured in various ways ranging from conservative as practiced by Abdul Wahab in Saudi, integralization carried out by Muhammad Abduh (Azra, 2014b), Revitalization as carried out by Rasyid Ridha, Reconstruction as carried out by Sir Muhammad Iqbal and Cellularization as carried out by Syed Amir Ali. All of these movement models indirectly influenced the modernization models in Indonesia.

The first modern movement in Indonesia was recorded during the Dutch East Indies Government in Minangkabau which was carried out by the Padri movement. This movement was originally motivated by jealousy from conservative-Islamist parties who saw the triumph of traditional leaders as leaders of the country. This triumph occurred due to Minang Country which was able to produce a lot of agricultural and mining products. The increase in economic activity was also triggered by changes in the global economic constellation. The collapse of Napoleon allowed Britain and the Netherlands to conduct trade transactions more aggressively (Caroll Kersten, 2017).

In this regard, Minangkabau revivalist muslim scholars who had completed their education under the influence of Wahhabism in the Hijaz such as Haji Miskin, Haji Piobang and Haji Sumanik criticized the policies of traditional leaders who allowed cultural practices that they considered to be acts of heresy, khurafat and superstition. These muslim scholars considered that culture is syirik (Azra, 2004).

Not heeding the warnings, the Wahhabi muslim scholars gathered followers and attacked the Pagaruyung Kingdom. The continuous war made the Netherlands a disadvantage due to economic chaos. The Netherlands came here due to the invitation of traditional elders. The Netherlands has repeatedly rejected to have a war. They came only to secure their trade. But the Padri troops did not heed it until the war continued for decades (Hadler, 2008; Yetti, 2008). The Padri War turned into a war against colonialism which the Indonesian government later considered a war against the Dutch colonialists until the continuation of the Padri War, Tuanku Imam Bonjol was appointed a National Hero (Fenton, 2015). The Dutch East Indies, which succeeded in conquering the Padri Army, later built a monument to the Padri War and this led to the romance of the Minang people that they had persistently fought against the Dutch colonialists.

Appreciation for the Padri troops and the ease with which modern Islamic organizations were born under the Dutch East Indies government made the accommodative political value of this government high. The Netherlands only needs the approval of traditional leaders to establish an Islamic organization. Because many Islamic organizations were trained by priyanyi such as Sarekat Islam (SI) which was founded by H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto and Raden Mas Tirtoadhisuryo. This organization can be said to be the first modern Islamic organization on a national scale (Noer, 1996). The motive for the establishment of Sarekat Islam (SI) was for economic benefit. Later on the SI also turned into a political organization. The presence of SI has made the spirit of nationalism even higher. The SI can be said to be the upstream for the various downstream branches of Islamic modernism. Radical, moderate, socialist, conservative Muslims all converge on the SI (Hongxuan, 2018).

The experience of modern Minangkabau intelligence gave a lot of color to Islamic modernism in the Dutch East Indies. The presence of Agus Salim made the SI more stable from the infiltration of socialist groups. He made the SI more exclusive. The spirit of the SI became very similar to the Muhammadiyah founded by Ahmad Dahlan. Dahlan and Salim are both Hijaz alumni. Their perspective was the same, namely that they wanted to eliminate the cultural practices of the archipelago because they were considered heretical, khurafat and syirik (Qoyyim, 2015).

Through the Muhammadiyah movement, Ahmad Dahlan, who was also a member of the SI, focused on anti-culture. The organization was engaged in health and education. In Aceh, Muhammadiyah was accepted by Uleebalangs (District leaders appointed by the Dutch East Indies) who wanted to show that they were accommodating to Islam, but the organization did not get a good place in (Muhammadiyah: Usut Kasus-Pembakaran Masjid Di Aceh, 2017). Muhammadiyah is still remembered as an organization that is more towards a fundamentalist attitude even though it has recently tried to accommodate Al-Ghazalian Sufism (Biyanto, 2017).

It was the same as Agus Salim and Ahmad Dahlan, Ahmad Muhammad Surkati was also the Hijaz alumnus who founded Al-Irsyad. The organization also shared similarities with Muhammadiyah, namely removing local culture which was considered the practice of syirik. The aim of this organization is to apply Arabic culture and literalistic religious practices in the archipelago (Caroll Kersten, 2017).

Apart from Al-Ershad, Persis was also established. Led by textile entrepreneurs, led by A. Hassan, Persis had a member of the smart and modern-minded youth from Minangkabau, namely Mohammad Natsir (Mat Diah & Cholil, 2018). Persis also carried the principle of resistance to local cultural practices that were considered heretical, khurafat and heretical. Persis had been heavily influenced by the thoughts of the Jamaat Islam movement led by Abu A'la Al-Maududi and Ikhwanul Muslim led by Hasan Al-Banna. This influence made Persis more aggressive in spreading his views. The provocative writings in the Pembela Islam newspaper made the Netherlands stop its publication which had been running for six years (Caroll Kersten, 2017).

The Dutch response to fundamental organizations such as Persis was so soft, it only banned the publication of the Islamic Defenders newspaper because its actions were very extreme by taking actions that endangered religious harmony, even Persis was able to publish other media newspapers namely Al-Lisan which was published until Japan deployed their troops (Suharto, 2011).

These Islamic organizations were easy to establish without getting tight protection from the Dutch East Indies Government. The blessing of traditional leaders as local leaders who became partners of the Netherlands was sufficient for the Netherlands to prove that these organizations did not endanger the organizations initiated and supported by traditional leaders (Kamila, 2017).

In Aceh, the first Islamic educational institution was founded by Teuku Raja Keumala. Furthermore, many local Islamic educational institutions were established as a response to modernism. Furthermore, the leaders of modern Islamic education institutions gathered to establish PUSA (the association of Muslim scholars throughout Aceh). The PUSA was established as a response to uleebalangs in various regions in Aceh who opened branches of modern Islamic organizations (Kamila, 2017). According to modernist muslim scholars, these organizations were not compatible with Acehnese culture. They offer the PUSA as an alternative. In order to receive the blessing of the Netherlands, Teuku Chik Peusangan stood at the forefront of the establishment of the organization. But then the PUSA became an organization that massacred Uleebalangs (Munhanif et al., 2016).

But look at how the Indonesian government made Tuanku Imam Bonjol a national hero. Yet it is clear that he was the leader of the Padri Islamic radical movement. Likewise, the PUSA members had an honorable position because they succeeded in conquering the Uleebalang (Munhanif, 2016). The PUSA is the initiator of the joining of Aceh with the Indonesian Government. Without PUSA, maybe the Dutch troops entered Aceh during Military Aggression II and thwarted the integration of Indonesia and Aceh. Without PUSA, perhaps only Aceh would be left behind to become a Dutch colony while Indonesia gained independence.

Just as Nahdatul Ulama (NU) claims to be a traditional representation of Islam and was established in response to the emergence of various modern Islamic organizations, the PUSA also claims to have been born from the same spirit. But actually the establishment of PUSA was not much different from the Padri and the SI Movement. The motive was socio-economic. Meanwhile, the NU has similarities with Muhammadiyah and other moderate Islamic organizations, which were founded by Hijaz alumni (Bruinessen, 2009).

Because the intricacies of the development of the Jawi movement in the Hijaz had been known, in which Snouck Hurgrenje played a big role, and understood that socio-economy was the main motive, that was why moderate Islamic movements that approach fundamentalism can flourish during the Government era of Dutch Indies (Burhanudin, 2015; Fogg, 2014). In addition, the leaders of modern Islamic organizations had contact with Dutch elementary schools (Iqbal, 1989).

Schools were part of the Ethical Policy (Niel, 1984) of the Dutch East Indies which was implemented by the powerful Kingdom of the Netherlands due to a paradigm shift in a country treated the powerless society and community organizations. The paradigm shift in state policy changed from a hegemonic system as later discussed by Gramsci (Bates, 1975; Martin, 1997) to a system of prioritizing order with various approaches including accommodative as later discussed by Foucault (Foucault, 1982; Green, 2010).

The soft-power or accommodative political system applied in the Dutch East Indies to moderate Islamic movements and organizations with fundamental views was for three reasons. First, the movement had socio-economic motives, not religious principles. In this case, the Dutch East Indies only reacted when their economic interests were disturbed, such as Padri War (Fenton, 2015). Second, because the Dutch East Indies had understood the movement and the Ideology of the Hijaz, so that it was able to overcome the aspirations of the modern movement led by Hijaz alumni (Burhanudin, 2015). If abstracted in a broader Islamic condition, the Hijaz alumni movement in the Dutch East Indies was beneficial because it could ensure that the condition of Turkey, which Europe was trying to conquer, did not affect the emotions and anger of the Jawi people. Third, because the organizers of Islamic modernism were familiar or even received basic education from Dutch schools. This could make the Dutch East Indies confident that these modern Islamic movements would not jeopardize the long-term interests of the Government. And it was proven that what made the Dutch East Indies collapse was not because of the modern movements, but Japan did.

Masyumi as the Unification of Islamic Organizations in the Japanese Occupation

In the final period of the Dutch East Indies Government, three models of Islamic thought had been formed in Indonesia, namely modernist which represented names such as Agus Salim, A. Hassan, Mohammad Natsir, Kartosowirdjo and Daud Beureueh. On the traditionalist side there were Hasyim Asy'ari, Teungku Hasan Krung Kale in Aceh and secularists such as Soekarno, Soepomo and Hatta (Latif, 2014; Suhelmi, 2007). The traditionalists played little role in the late Dutch East Indies period. The dispute occurred between modernists and secularists. The dispute culminated in a debate between A. Hassan and Soekarno (Soekarno, 1964).

Yudi Latif (Latif, 2014) showed an interesting way to differentiate Muslim modernists from secularists. Modernists wanted a State based on Islam. Meanwhile, secularists wanted the State based on shared values. However, not all modernists wanted Islam as the basis of the State. Some of them also wanted a state based on shared values, but they wanted Islamic values to dominate. This desire for domination made the modernist relationship with the State not always get along (Noer, 1996).

The dispute between the modernist group and the Dutch East Indies had occurred due to policies regulating marriage in conventional legal institutions (Noer, 1996). The presence of Japan made an appreciation of the aspirations of moderate Islam by establishing the KUA (Office of Religious Affairs) to handle the registration of religious laws such as marriage and so forth. Hizbullah and PETA (Patriot Movement) which will later strengthen the TNI (Indonesian National Army) were also Japanese appreciation. Moreover, the establishment of Masyumi as an organization that not only intends to unite modern Islamic organizations but also traditional Islam (Noor, 2016).

Modernist Islam was eagerly awaiting Japan's presence because they hoped to replace the secular group which was highly appreciated by the Dutch. Modernist hopep of gaining an important position were met. But it was still localized. Because they had more competence, secular groups continue to dominate important positions in the Japanese government. In Aceh, the Cumbok war exploded due to the jealousy of PUSA (the association of muslim scholars throughout Aceh) modernists towards Uleebalangs (Kamila, 2017).

Japan had the interests of the Muslim ummah. Japan hoped that the Islamic community can make a military contribution to help them in the Pacific War. At the same time Japan provided support for Muslim intellectual groups to form an independence preparation committee (Abdullah, 2018).

Instead of appreciating the modernist group too much, Japan was more hopeful of the traditional group (Nasution et al., 2019). They saw the great potential for recruiting troops in the traditional circles. But it turned out that traditionalists did not like Japan. They fought a lot against Japan. Some physical contact took place in East Java which is a traditional base. In Aceh, a major war broke out between Japan and a Dayah (Islamic Boarding Schools) group in Cot Pling Bayu, North Aceh (Said, n.d.). Traditionalist rejection of Japan mainly occurred because they considered Japan to be adherents of the sun worshiping teachings (Miller et al., 2002; Shigehiro, 2014).

Although in some ways Japan had been repressive as a result of placing too much hope on the Indonesian people, Azyumardi Azra (Azra, 2005, 2014a) noted several roles of Japan for the Muslim community, including the establishment of the Office of Religious Affairs (KUA). This institution resolved the anger of the Muslim community over the policy of the Dutch East Indies Government which made religious matters handled by conventional legal institutions (Kersten, 2017). This institution then became the embryo of the Ministry of Religion which handled a lot of matters. Another equally important contribution was the establishment of Masyumi as a result of the unification of various religious organizations which later played an important role in New Order politics and its influence can still be seen today.

Old Order Handled Masyumi and Radicalism

The Old Order was a period when Indonesia was involved in many problems so that it was unable to construct a stable government system. There were many radical Islamic movements taking place in Indonesia and they had no direct connection with global terrorism except for the modernist Muslim rebellion movement which was an alumni of the Hijaz so that the rebellions occurred rooted in a literalistic view of the status of a country (Latif, 2014).

There was no absolute agreement between secular groups and conservative modernists. The Jakarta Piagam which contains the obligations of the Islamic community to carry out Islamic law as the basis of the state was the hope of Indonesia as an Islamic state by modernists. But Soekarno canceled that article and replaced it with the Pancasila (The Five Principles) which is known today (Kersten, 2017).

At the beginning of independence, although two secular intelligentsia, Soekarno and Hatta, were at the peak of power, modernist forces were very strong in Masjumi's representation. However, Masyumi's planned to make Indonesia an Islamic state was delayed due to the state's condition that had to fight against the Dutch and the communist coup plan. In terms of fighting the Dutch Military Session, all groups were united (Latif, 2015).

The presence of Darul Islam (DI - Islamic Organization)/Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII - Indonesian Muslim Army) as a result of Kartosoewirdjo's actions left the Netherlands and Indonesia with no other way but to respond with an armed movement (Kersten, 2015). But the war between DI/TII and the TNI made the Dutch happy. Then Natsir and A. Hassan tried a negotiation approach but failed. Kartosoewirdjo's rebellion showed that modernists did adhere to fundamental religious beliefs. Likewise, the modern movement in Aceh which was united in the PUSA Aceh participated in the DI/TII rebellion in Aceh (Burhanudin, 2014).

Kartosoewirdjo was the same as other modernists like Natsir who wanted Islam to be the basis of the state. But the way they go is different. Kartosoewirdjo chose an extreme path, he fought for his movement by means of terror (Carool Kersten, 2015). Meanwhile Natsir also had the same desire but chose a different way. Natsir wanted Kartosoewirdjo to fight for Islam again through parliament. But failed in the end, the repressive way was again chosen to beat DI/TII.

Kartosoewirjo had many followers. Apart from Daud Beureueh in Aceh, he was also supported by Kahar Muzakkar in Sulawesi. In Kalimantan supported by Kiai Ibu Hajar. Kartosoewirjo and other DI movements were successfully crippled by the Indonesian government because this movement was not only opposed by government authorities, namely Soekarno and his secular groups, but also by his modernist colleagues (Ausop, 2009).

But his modernist colleagues who took the parliamentary route were not much different from Kartosoewirdjo's fate. Natsir's ambition to control the cabinet and his political maneuvers was not only opposed by the traditionalist group within Masyumi, namely representatives of the NU, but also other modernists. The departure of the NU from Masyumi showed that traditionalists can never get along with modernists (Bruinessen, 2009). Unlike modernists, traditionalists really had no intention of establishing an Islamic State. This traditionalist attitude showed their deep educational background and totality in studying religion. This was different from modernist groups who had ambitions to establish an Islamic State (Hefner, 2001).

With Soekarno's point of view as the official government of Indonesia to measure the government's attitude towards Islamist groups, the point of view applied must position Soekarno flawlessly. Soekarno's political attitudes which were considered negative such as implementing Guided Democracy must be considered normal. What needs to be measured was how to deal with Islamists who were divided into radicals such as DI/TII and diplomatic ones like Masyumi (Mat Diah & Cholil, 2018).

The government had put forward a diplomatic stance to handle the DI/TII. Natsir was sent by Hatta to persuade Kartosoewiryo to go down the mountain but failed. Since this movement was subversive, threatens sovereignty and an act of terrorism, it was natural for the government to handle it by military means. Finally Kartosoewiryo was arrested and executed. Meanwhile in Aceh, Beureueh was persuaded to go down the mountain (Iqbal & Rizal, 2012).

Despite his subversive actions, Beureueh was only placed under house arrest. His case was different from Kartosoewirdjo's who refused to go down the mountain and had to be arrested and executed. Beureueh was persuaded by Hasjmy. The government had even provided a lot of compensation to Acehnese Islamists by establishing the Darussalam Student Complex (Kopelma), establishing the Ulama Consultative Assembly (MPU), the Regional Education Council (MPD), the Aceh Baitulmal Agency (BMA) as a form of regional privileges given to Aceh and institutions Aceh Customs and Culture which later transformed into the Aceh Traditional Council (Iqbal & Rizal, 2012).

Meanwhile, Masyumi, who had seriously threatened the Republic of Indonesia, split him up and disbanded at the last leadership in the hands of Prawoto Mangkusasmito (Karim, 2019). Former Masjumi officials were forced to self-isolate. The Al-Azhar Mosque had become an escape for former Masjumi members in Jakarta. The mosque was led by Hamka (Steenbrink, 2014). Hasjmy and the author of Tafsir Al-Azhar had many similarities with A. Hasjmy. Apart from being equally productive in writing religious and literary books, both of them were also arrested for being accused of being involved in radical movements and terrorism (Yakub, 2013). They both seem to share the same level of Islamism. Both were at the same radical-nationalism boundary (Yakub, 2013).

Although Hamka and Hasjmy did not involve in radical and extreme movements, they quoted Azra's term, the distance was only by hair ends. Natsir who wanted to Islamize the State (Nurdin, 2016). Meanwhile, the radical movements of Natsir's idea were Kartosoewirdjo, Kahar Muzakkar and Daud Beureueh (Ausop, 2009). For this reason, figures like Hasjmy and Hamka should be watched out for, but people like them should not be accused of subversive acts (Yakub, 2013). In this case, the focus of government action should be on modernist figures who did not commit acts of subversion such as Natsir, Hamka and Hasjmy. If Hasjmy and Hamka had the same opportunity as Natsir, of course they would act like Natsir's actions. But actions like Kartosoewirdjo need not be considered because DI/TII is subversion and must be stopped (Hasbi, 2014). Did the government exercise soft power to handle Natsir? Could the soft power used if Natsir was arrested. This was natural because the government, as described by Foucault, has the function of disciplining to achieve stability (Foucault, 1982; O’Neill, 1986). Meanwhile, Natsir's actions included subversion (Kersten, 2015). But why was the government being tough on Hamka? Was this statement understandable: Because the government did not want Masjumi's existence to return. Meanwhile, many former Masjumi members took refuge in Hamka.

The arrest of several modernist groups made the value of implementing the New Order's accommodative politics weak. But overall, the high appreciation for Hasjmy and modernists in Aceh until they mastered the narrative towards the formalization of Islamic law (Salim, 2015) by modernist groups, especially from IAIN Ar-Raniry, is also worth considering. Even nationally, the strengthening of the role of the Ministry of Religion and the spread of IAIN throughout Indonesia was an accommodative form of the government towards modernists. The attitude of accommodation and providing space for expression within certain limits was very important so as not to give rise to radical movements and terrorism. However, the modernist movement in any form always had the opportunity for the emergence of fundamentalist ideas which were potential for radicalism. Radicalism was a fire in the husk to create terrorism (Garadian, 2018). And the New Order government was very clever at letting the fire in the husks not burn.

New Order as a Heaven for Radicalism

The anti-Western economic policies implemented by Soekarno made the Indonesian economy chaotic. He tried to approach the Eastern Bloc but was immediately suspected of being pro-communist. Finally the TNI AD (Indonesian National Army) staged a coup. Suharto was sent to leadership (Burhanudin & van Dijk, 2013).

Initially Suharto's presence was considered by former Masjumi as a momentum to revive Masyumi. But it was very difficult. The former Masjumi had traumatized Suharto. Their past actions could really pose a threat. As a military that was not close to Islamist groups, Suharto did not need them at all. This indifferent attitude turned out to benefit former Masyumi members (van Bruinessen, 2002).

Initially the traditional groups were close to Suharto. The main reason was because Ansor, as the wing of NU, had a big role in crushing PKI (Indonesian Comunist Party). The PKI ghost has indeed become an exaggerated issue and had made many innocent people become victims. At that time, if you were not happy with someone, it was enough to spread the issue that he was PKI and someone would cut his neck. Likewise, sometimes there were people who walked together with their friends to a quiet place; one person killed the other because they did not like it, they were resentful or because they were rumoured to be PKI. The next day his body would be believed to be the corpse of the PKI. That was Suharto’s action because he wanted to wipe out the PKI (Wieringa, 2003).

Former Masjumi officials were not given room for practical politics. Natsir was given permission to establish DDII (Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council). This Institution was used for education and preaching (Raihan, 2016). On the other hand, Natsir used this institution to make contact with various international Islamic gangs, including those that carried out terrorist regeneration. The most famous terrorist who emerged through the Natsir network was Abu Bakar Baasyir (Carool Kersten, 2015, p. 28). Natsir continued to build relationships with his fellow radicals abroad such as high-ranking Muslim Brotherhood leaders in Egypt, top leaders of the Islamic Jamaat in Pakistan and other international radical Islamic movements (Mukherjee, 2010).

Abu Bakar Baasyir founded Ponduk Ngruki in Sukoharjo as a Pesantren (Islamic Boarding School) that taught religious fundamentalism. Natsir also recruited other figures such as Imaduddin Abdurrahman to spread radical views on campus. The thoughts of his cadres and the network of movements built by Natsir were sufficient to describe who Natsir was and what Islamists were actually like (Fogg, 2013).

The DDII organization kept in touch with fundamentalist organizations, radicalists, terrorists, international jihadists. During the New Order era, Christianization plagued various corners of Indonesia. As a da'wah organization, the DDII felt that it had a big burden to stop the movement (Hefner, 2001). At the same time, the DDII consistently spreads radical views. The government took no action. Pondok Ngruki, which is a forum for fundamentalist regeneration, was also safe.

In this case, it can be seen how the Suharto government, even though it had a very bad experience with Islamists, it still did not make them act repressively. Even though Natsir's actions had led to criminals. It was clear that Natsir and the DDII opened up relations with international terrorist organizations and carried out terrorist regeneration in Indonesia. But the government did not act on him.

Opinions that consider Suharto as repressive towards Islamist groups of Islam were exactly the ghosts of the PKI. Facts contradicted to reality. Suharto did not need an Islamist group. Military strength was enough to make him sturdy. So all activities of Islamism were left alone. Regarding his proximity to traditionalist groups, at the beginning of his reign, it was neither beneficial nor detrimental to Suharto. This reason also seems to make Suharto did not care about the terrorist movements played by modernists. Instead of acting repressively, the New Order can be said to be the sowing period of fundamentalism and radicalism in Indonesia. But his acts of terror could not erupt because of the government's intelligence and military strength (Hefner, 2001). The actualization of the State concept described by Foucault, which sees the state as a disciplinary institution (Foucault, 1982; Green, 2010) only, had an orderly effect on the surface. But radical movements flourished underground.

The Iranian revolution also greatly helped the growth of the tarbiyah fundamentalist movement. The New Order took advantage of the existence of this movement to stem the outbreak of the spirit of the Iranian revolution. By raising the stigma of Syi'ah as a revolutionary actor, the strategy was to continually campaign that Syi'ah was heretical teaching (Nasution & Miswari, 2017). The main actors of the deviant Syi'ah campaign were of course the DDII and the other radical tarbiyah movements (Ramakrishna, 2009).

In this case, Suharto also benefited from the existence of this radical Islamic movement. Suharto's claimed to act as emphatically against Islamist groups by implementing the Sole Principle of Pancasila for all mass and community organizations was only an implication of the Pancasila radicalization program policy in the government's Guidelines for the Living and Practicing of Pancasila (P4) (Lestari & Ruhadi, 2017). Even radical teachings that had become a serious problem on campuses were only handled by normalizing campus life which was also an inseparable program with P4.

Instead of being said to be repressive, even during the New Order era, various forms of thinking in Islam developed. Nurcholish Madjid (Cak Nur) and Ahmad Wahib started secular Islamic thought with the principle of political desacralization (Nurcholish Madjid, 2019). Ahmad Wahib wanted Islam not to be crushed by the times because it followed the rules of Islamic law that were no longer relevant to its era (Wahib, 1981). Cak Nur wanted to make him aware that Islam as a religion is sacred in nature. Meanwhile, politics and other pragmatic activities were profane. The two must not be mixed. Because if the sacred was involved in the profane, then the sacred would be practiced. On the other hand, if the profane was involved in the sacred, the profane would be sacred. These two segments had a foundation (ontology), approach (epistemology) and orientation (axiology). Because they were different, they must be treated differently according to their respective segments (Madjid, 2008).

Cak Nur was accused of heresy by Islamist groups such as Rasjidi and Natsir. However, he was supported by Harun Nasution and Mukti Ali (Munhanif, 2014). In this case, it can be mapped which are secular modernists and which are fundamental modernists. The influence of Cak Nur made HMI MPO (Islamic Students Association) an organization separate from the principles of other Masyumi children's organizations, namely GPII and PII (Hefner, 2001). But Cak Nur, who infiltrated the ideas of secularism, liberalism and pluralism into the HMI MPO, admitted that his idea was an ideal representation of the Masjumi spirit as he carried out in Paramadina (Gaus, 2010; Madjid, 2019).

During the New Order era, the role of the IAIN (State Institute of Islamic Studies) was very significant. Many IAIN alumni were sent to the West and Middle East to study. The result was the emergence of dynamic renewal ideas such as Cak Nur, Azumardi Azra, (Baharuddin, 2018) and Fachry Ali. The departure of the NU traditionalists from practical politics allowed traditional groups to focus more on education (Bruinessen, 2009). They also criticized the government policies. Slowly but surely, Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) provided education for the Indonesian people to realize that we live in a modern nation. According to Gus Dur, Indonesians should be proud of their own cultural treasures, not easily fascinated by the appearance of religious thoughts and practices of other nations (Wahid, 2007). Since the mid-eighties, after breaking away from the influence of the generals, Suharto seemed to want to collect his services from Islamist groups. He began to join the modern group. The result was the establishment of the Indonesian Muslim Scholars Association (ICMI) (Ali, 1995). Dawam Rahardjo and Imaduddin Abdurrahman were among the intelligentsia who played an important role. In this case, Gus Dur refused to join.

Gus Dur's refusal to join ICMI is a sign that ICMI was only to represent a moderate group that was close to fundamental principles. But public figures like Dawam Rahardo were confusing. Dawam and Kuntowijoyo, for example, were public figures in the middle between Imaduddin via a vis Cak Nur. Dawam and Kuntowijoyo had the PII (Indonesian Islamic Students) backgrounds. This modernist organization that was established during the Dutch military aggression was Masyumi's son who was treated by the DDII during the New Order era. These two figures wanted Islamic values to be infiltrated into the system. Such thoughts were also synonymous with Hasjmy. Again, to quote Azra's term, they were in a position of hair ends to become fundamentalists.

In this case, it is important to distinguish modernists who wanted Islamic values to be infiltrated into an objective system. Hamka, Amien Rais, Hasjmy, Dawam Rahardjo and Kuntowijoyo had this pattern. Meanwhile Intelligence such as Soekarno, Cak Nur, Ahmad Wahib, Gus Dur, Ahmad Syafi'i Ma'arif, Azyumardi Azra and Budhy Munawar-Rachman could accept the values of religion and culture as long as they were good in objective space. The first group had the opportunity to act like Natsir to implement Islam as a system if they had the opportunity. The second group can be said to be the most reliable and expected intelligence to maintain the integrity of a pluralistic nation like Indonesia.

Suharto hoped to approach the two Islamist groups after relations with the generals deteriorated. It turned out that Islamist groups opened up opportunities to approach Suharto. Closeness to Islamist groups could not improve Suharto's position. At the insistence of Islamists like Amin Rais, who controlled students who were already heavily influenced by the tarbiyah movement, and followed the advice of important figures such as Cak Nun, Gus Dur, Cak Nur and Megawati, Suharto resigned his post.

The Islamism movement had become very widespread in Indonesia (Mujani & Liddle, 2005). That was the end of Suharto, who was too close to Islamists. In fact, he had trusted Yusril Ihza Mahendra as his personal assistant. Later on, Yusril became the leader of the Bulan Bintang Party, Masjumi's ideological son. The New Order's lenient attitude towards Islamism made this period difficult to compare with the Dutch East Indies. However, due to excessive omission, the New Order can be said to be the softest against Islamists. The New Order exercised power most closely with what Foucault described as discipline (Foucault, 1982). The level of accommodative politics in the New Order was followed by the Dutch East Indies, Japan and finally the Old Order. The final task of this article is to analyze the post-Reformation position among the gradations in the implementation of accommodative politics from the periods described.

Post-Reform Systematization

The fall of Suharto caused all the potential that emerged during the New Order to be actualized (van Bruinessen, 2002). The formalization of Islamic law in Aceh (Ansor & Muhammad, 2016; Salim, 2015) was the actuality of the potential for modernist imagination at IAIN Ar-Raniry which was given with the hope of reducing the potential for GAM (Free Aceh Movement) secular rebellion (Stange & Missbach, 2011) which was hidden throughout the New Order (Priyono AE, 2005). The map of Islamic thought has also experienced a shift (Bustamam-Ahmad, 2011).

Various forms of terror had also occurred in Indonesia such as the Bali Bombing and the Sarinah Bombing and various other acts of terrorism (Batubara, 2018; Hughes, 2010). This terrorism, which was related to international terrorism networks, was built during the New Order. New phenomena emerged after Suharto (van Bruinessen, 2002).

Taliban terrorists born in Afghanistan who were born by the support of the United States of America's original goal to fight the Soviet Union. But after the Soviet Union collapsed, the Taliban transformed and attacked the United States. Osama bin Laden was a key figure in the movement (Azra, 2018; Pape & Feldman, 2013). He was a disappointed Saudi family businessman. Most of religious movements always originated from economic problems (Caroll Kersten, 2017).

The Taliban had good relations with terrorism networks in Indonesia. Even in Menteng Raya 58 there was an Afghan alumni association. Their existence was very open. This network was knitted by Natsir and the DDII (Raihan, 2016) during the New Order era and was left behind by Suharto. The Southeast Asian Jamaah Ismamiyah terrorism network was also strong in Indonesia. The Bali bombing occurred as a result of the act of terrorists who had links with the terrorism movement in Afghanistan and Jemaah Islamiah.

Gus Dur and Megawati seemed powerless to deal with the problem of terrorism in the early post-Reformation period. The PBB (Star Moon Party) and PKS (Social Justice Party) were considered unable to represent the aspirations of the Islamist group. As a result, radical groups like FPI (Islamic Defenders Front) emerged and took disturbing actions. The various riots caused by the FPI did not make Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) dismiss them (Fuller, 2011; Sukayat, 2018).

In fact, the FPI had no direct relationship with terrorism in Bali and other acts of terror in Indonesia (Hughes, 2010). FPI had no network with international terrorist groups. But their actions were seen as unsettling. If the HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia) had a relationship with the Natsir network, then FPI was really just an organization driven by the Habbaib association. Their masses were large because Habbaib had many Islamic boarding schools and recitation congregations (Rubaidi, 2014).

Meanwhile, Joko Widodo (Jokowi), whose leadership was blasphemed by the FPI, did not really respond to this action. A soft attitude was still prioritized. Many mass actions held by the FPI had never been banned by the government.

Before the government, fundamental organizations such as the FPI and HTI had a very regular attitude. Under SBY's leadership, the HTI which looked orderly managed to hold many large activities. That was what makes the HTI able to carry out a regeneration movement that reached to campuses and schools. However, because it was considered to contain principles that were against national sovereignty as a result of fighting for the caliphate system, the HTI was dismissed by Jokowi.

Although it was not directly related, the HTI and FPI events were attended by overlapping masses. They got sympathy and support from urban people who did not have many opportunities to study religion seriously. The symbolic movement carried out by the FPI made many Muslims enthusiastic in attending the events. This system was also carried out by IAIN in Aceh in influencing traditional Muslim communities to be fascinated by the formalization of Islamic law. The FPI's symbolic gears were actually easily realized by traditionalists who had studied religion systematically in traditional Pesantren (Islamic Boarding School). That was why the FPI and HTI were strongly opposed by Ansor, who in fact were students of traditional Islamic boarding schools (Harris, 1976; Rubaidi, 2014). While the FPI members generally only learned religion through short recitations and the internet (Ahyar, 2017).

The polite attitude of SBY and Jokowi made the post-Reformation impression as a regime that can also be said to be soft-power. Moreover, SBY was too permissive. However, Jokowi's omissions even though he was often a target personally should be taken into account. President SBY succeeded in stifling moderate movements by tightening formal education. This step was polite but deadly, in contrast to what Suharto did, who applied omission under control. These considerations made the New Order more permissive than the post-Reformation. The policing system as stated by Foucault (O’Neill, 1986) was carried out well by SBY through the conditionalization of formal education and Jokowi by dissolving the HTI constitutionally. The regulations made by SBY made him the ruler which made the radical groups very depressed. Jokowi's attitude in dissolving the HTI also made Post-Reform credit no better than the Japanese occupation. SBY made room for groups, say neo-traditionalists, or secular groups according to the term Islamism groups get a big stage.

SBY's policy was not only to reduce opportunities for regeneration of radical groups, but also to suppress progressive groups. Especially with the issuance of a fatwa (a strong statement) from the MUI (Indonesian Council of Muslim Scholars) that decided to prohibit secularism, pluralism and liberalism (Munhanif, 2014). The fatwa had a huge effect in paralyzing the spirit of progressive Islamic thought (Miswari, 2019). The impact of SBY and Jokowi's policies has yet to be seen. But their systematization certainly made the Post-Reformation period under the system of accommodating Japanese Occupation policies so as to make Post-Reformation at the lowest level in the gradation of accommodative politics.

Conclusion

Azrumardi Azra's statement that the government applied accommodative politics in Indonesia has occurred since the Dutch East Indies Government. This article has analyzed the struggle between the state and the Islamic movement with the government from the Dutch East Indies to the Post-Reformation. The results show, the level of accommodative politics applied between government regimes, especially against radical movements or "fire in the husks" (Saputra, 2018) in order from the softest (soft-power) to the least gentle is: New Order, Dutch East Indies, Japanese Occupation, Old Order and Post-Reformation.

With the indicators of limiting freedom and the impact of government policies on the Islamic movement, the New Order was the most accommodating regime. This regime made the Islamic movement import many radical ideologies from the international jihadist movement so that after the Reformation, the spirit and movement of radicalism grew rapidly and was very free to carry out its actions.

A major contribution of the Dutch Indies accommodative policy was the establishment of many Islamic movements. Establishing Islamic movements became very easy during this period. The impact was influential throughout the Dutch East Indies Government until the Post-Reformation. They only acted repressively against the chaos created by the Padri troops. The Japanese occupation did have an influence on the establishment of Masyumi and KUA, who afterwards took a big role in politics and government. But Japanese motives are very pragmatic. The act of dissolving Masjumi and getting rid of its former members by the Old Order was an act that paralyzed the Islamic movement in controlling the system which made them transform into another form. This made the level of implementation of the soft power of the government during that period weak. Post-Reformation actually shows as if the government is ignoring Islamic movements, but the restraint through system regulation, although less aware of it and less visible impact, it can paralyze those movements.

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