Keywords

Regulation Development, National Fish Logistics System, Good Governance.

Introduction

Realizing national sovereignty, independence and food security requires guarantee of availability, affordability and sustainability for the fulfillment of fish consumption and the fish processing industry. To fulfill this, there is a need to guarantee the procurement, storage, transportation and distribution of fishery fish, as well as materials and production equipment through the National Fish Logistics System (System Logistic Iran National, referred as SLIN) and to realize the SLIN the government issues the regulation of Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Affairs, Permen-KP No. 5 of 2014. SLIN is a fish supply chain management system and fishery products, materials and production tools as well as information ranging from procurement, storage, to distribution, as a whole of policies to increase capacity and stabilize the upstream-downstream fisheries production system, control needs domestic consumption. The realization of the SLIN implementation of the Central Java Provincial Government actually has provided a place to buy and sell fish, namely the Fish Auction Place (Tempat Pelelangan Ikan, referred as TPI) in a program to improve the welfare of fishermen. TPI in the course of time becomes the center of fishermen activities, so that it is an important facility in fisheries activities and also a driving force in improving the business and welfare of fishermen. The aims and objectives of the TPI are among others to facilitate the implementation of auction operations, strive for price stability and improve the standard of living and welfare of fishermen and increase regional income. Although a fish auction system, a market uses an intermediary system (bargaining agent) by passing a public offering. Those who are entitled to get the auctioned fish are the highest bidder. This mechanism aims to protect fishermen from price games carried out by middlemen or intermediary and help fishermen get the right and help fishermen in developing their businesses.

In the implementation of SLIN in the fish auction system at TPI, there was a gap phenomenon, such as many fish buying and selling transactions that were done by blocking fishermen who had just returned from going to sea before they arrived at TPI. The practice of selling fish outside the TPI is very detrimental to fishermen, because the price of fish outside the TPI can be played by traders. Another gap phenomenon that is detrimental to fishermen as well, namely the payment of auction prices that should be cash, some auction winners will delay payments or even not be paid. Fishermen cannot do anything, let alone the nature of fish that decompose easily and in some places there is no cold storage available. This condition forces small fishermen to immediately hand over their fish to buyers. This has resulted in the swelling of the value of Lack of Fish Auction Payments (Kekurangan Pembayaran Lelang Ikan, referred to KPLI). The existence of KPLI is not only detrimental to fishermen and fish owners, but also the local government also receives the impact. The levies that should have been collected can be deferred and reduce the income from related institutions which should also be included in the regional revenue. If this is allowed to continue, the question arises: what about the principle of fairness that is the right of fishermen? And, what about the legal protection given to fishermen? And, how to reduce poverty in the fishing community group? The principle of fairness, desirable, proper, appropriate in legitimacy theory (Lindblom, 1994; O'Donovan, 2002) must be available in designing a social contract in the form of policy or regulation. Some of the regulations that underlie the regulation include Law No. 31 of 2004 concerning Fisheries; UU No. 23 of 2014 concerning Regional Government; Government Regulation No.38 of 2007 concerning the Division of Government Affairs between the Government, Provincial Governments and Regency/City Governments; all of which are expected to be able to oversee the implementation of the TPI fish auction system, so that a social contract will be legitimized which will ultimately be able to provide symmetrical information to all parties. This problem implies increasing costs for fishing communities, which leads to a decrease in the level of welfare of fishermen. The purpose of this study was to map capture fish distribution and formulate policy strategies and institutional distribution of capture fish in the districts/cities of Central Java which are ideally Good Governance principles in an effort to support SLIN.

Methodology

This study uses the Research and Development (R&D) model, through this model aims to produce a model of good governance-based TPI development. Model Research and Development has steps including Research and information collecting, Planning, Developing product form, preliminary field testing, Main product revision, Main field testing, Operational product revision, Operational field testing, Final product revision, Dissemination and implementation. In accordance with the stages in the study, the data collection techniques are grouped into three parts, namely: preliminary study phase, model development stage and model validation test stage. The populations in this study were all TPI in Central Java, amounting to 90 TPI. Sampling was carried out by purposive sampling, namely TPI Classes 1-3, as well as reviewing the possibility of developing TPI, by identifying inputs and outputs found in 10 (ten) TPI Classes 1-3 in Central Java, namely: TPI PPNP, Bajomulyo TPI, Tegal Port TPI, Tasikagung TPI, Karanganyar TPI, Sarang TPI, TPI Pandangan, TPI Klidang Lor, TPI PPSC and Tanjungsari.

The approach method used is normative juridical namely a study which deductively begins an analysis of the articles in the legislation governing the problem. Besides, it also uses descriptive methods that are explorative. Collecting data and information is carried out with a documentation, observation and interview approach.

Results And Discussion

Data so far shows that fisheries development in Central Java is still not successful in improving the welfare of fishermen, especially traditional fishermen and fishing workers. In general, the income of fishermen in regencies/cities in Central Java has increased quite significantly; it is natural to see fishermen's production also increase, as shown in Figure 1.

Productivity of catches and income of fishermen has increased, but the fishing community is still classified as poor fishermen. A quarter of the total poor population is from groups and families of traditional fishermen on the coast, namely 1.118 million people or 25.14% of the total poor population of Central Java as many as 4.450 million people (BPS, 2017). The factors that cause why fishermen are poor even though they are the main actors in the operation of marine fishing. The problems faced are complex in addition to the nature of fish which decompose rapidly, production fluctuates, access to capital is still lacking, post-harvest handling is not perfect, technology is still simple, location is scattered and the level of education of fishermen is low and there is attachment to money release. Other factors due to fishery port infrastructure and TPI in various regions have not provided a satisfactory contribution in improving the welfare of fishermen. The income of fishermen in addition to being determined by the captured fish results is also determined by their marketing system, where fishermen utilize the facilities built by the government through TPI.

TPI is one of the main functions in fisheries activities and also is one of the factors that drive and improve fisheries and fishermen's welfare. Fish that are easily decayed, after being unloaded from the ship, the fish must be handled quickly to maintain maximum quality, this causes the marketing system to become complex because of the time to sell the fish immediately, so that it does not run the risk of rotting, resulting in an unreasonable price or delayed payment. This condition is shown from the data obtained that in Central Java there is still a shortage of fish auction payments (KPLI) in all four fish auctions (TPI). The shortage of fish auction payments is, of course, causing fishermen's losses, because they are not paid in cash and also delayed payment of auction fees that must be received by the local government. This happened, not because it was not regulated in regional regulations, but not accompanied by good law enforcement. TPI managers are too easy to tolerate traders not to pay in cash, so that over time they accumulate and have difficulty collecting them. Excessive tolerance of TPI managers is seen in the compilation of data on the sample regency/city regulations that govern it (Table 1).

Table 1 District/City Local Regulations On Fish Auctions
No	District/City	Local Regulation	Payment Method	Form of Sanctions
1	Pekalongan Municipality	Perda No. 7/2011	Cash	No
2	Pati Regency	Perda No. 19/2009	Cash	No
3	Tegal Municipality	Perda No. 3/2010	Cash	No
4	Rembang Regency	Perda No. 8/2014	Cash	No
5	Kebumen Regency	Perda No. 15/2010	Cash	No
6	Batang Regency	Perda No. 5/2013	Cash	No
7	Cilacap Regency	Perda No. 7/2009	Cash	No

The sample data above shows that all regional regulations concerning fish auction places, regulating the obligations of traders/fishers to pay the auctioned fish in cash, but not accompanied by a threat of punishment for the offender, resulting in easy management to tolerate. This is as mentioned in the upfront, which causes there is always a shortage of fish auction payments. Actually this arrangement was held with the intention that fishermen were not harmed and always maintained their welfare. However, in practice, it encountered difficulties. The manager cannot apply regional regulations, even though the arrangement is mandatory. Instead, as a result of being unable to pay in cash, the fishermen looked for other ways, choosing to sell fish caught outside the TPI, by way of bonded labor or direct sales to traders outside the TPI, plus the reason for the auction process was too long so there were fears of rotten fish. Even though the price of fish sold in TPI is higher than that sold on the high seas or outside the TPI. This condition is exacerbated, the concession given from the TPI manager that allows sales without auction. The existence of this tolerance makes the absence of legal certainty the enactment of regional regulations that govern. According to Friedman, the operation of the law is determined by structure, substance and culture (Friedman, 1984).

Barriers to Legal Structure in TPI Governance

TPI management arrangements in all regency/city regulations have been regulated by the obligation of fishermen to conduct auction sales at TPI and auction fees that must be withdrawn from fishermen and buyers and traders pay in cash from the results of fish auctions, as data compilation from the sample that has been determined, the following analysis is obtained:

1. In its implementation it turns out that the obligation of fishermen to sell fish caught by auction at the TPI is not adhered to properly or violations occur in all districts/cities.

2. The cause is that there are no sanctions imposed on violators, but also that each TPI manager always tolerates fishermen to sell fish in the sea or transact with traders outside the TPI.

3. The absence of regulation of sanctions makes no forced action to be carried out, because there is no punishment given to the violator.

Sanctions found in legal norms differ from norms that are not legal. The fundamental difference between law and morals lies in forced action. There is no forced action on morals as a sanction (Kelsen, 1967). Fishermen reason to sell their fish outside the TPI, because of the need to be paid in cash. The sale of fish caught by auction at TPI is at risk of delayed payments, so that fishermen choose to violate the obligation to sell fish outside the TPI. The courage of fishermen violates the obligation because there is no risk of punishment that can be accepted. While the manager's tolerance is often given to fishermen because they feel unable to cope with delays in the payment of fish auction results. Even for certain times and certain types of fish are legally permitted fishermen to sell fish not through an auction at TPI, as the sample data obtained from the study, that in some TPIs, permits for expensive fish, such as shrimp and snapper are not allowed to be sold through auction. The catch has been neatly packaged from the ship and can be taken directly by traders with refrigerated box cars, it does not have to be weighed and auctioned. Whereas local regulations have been stated which stipulate that all fish caught by fishermen must be sold through auctions? This condition means that the local government does not obtain auction fees and also does not collect funds for famine or insurance that guarantees the risk of fishermen. In terms of law, fishermen do not get legal protection, so that fishermen do not get justice. This shows that the regional regulations governing TPI do not fulfill the element of justice.

For this unjust arrangement, it shows that the TPI does not have good governance. Even TPI was found at the Cilacap National Fisheries Port, there was no regional retribution on the grounds that the TPI building became the property of the central government, so that there were only administrative costs. The existence of TPI that is still managed by the central government, this gives an understanding that TPI's management authority is not consistently given to the district/city regional government, but depends on the ownership of the TPI building. Although Government Regulation No. 38 of 2007 concerning the Division of Government Affairs has been issued between the Government and Provincial Governments and Regency/City Governments, the central government is still not willing to authorize fisheries affairs in the field of fish auctions to district and city governments.

The criteria used, if the TPI building is owned by the Central Government, the regional regulations governing the TPI are not enforced. Here shows that the central government is not compliant with the implementation of Law Number 32 of 2014 concerning Regional Government, which gives authority to district/city regions to conduct TPI management. This condition makes the regions unable to do much to improve the welfare of fishermen, even though local regulations have been made which regulate the governance of TPI and the obligation to pay regional levies. Whereas the legal characteristics as a method must be generally accepted, apply to anyone without discrimination, unless the apparatus or law enforcers in their social reality apply discriminatively. If this happens, law enforcement does not reflect the existence of legal certainty and a sense of justice in the community, which means that the objective of establishing laws that govern TPI is not achieved.

Obstacles to Substance: Regional Regulations Regarding TPI

The contents of the regional regulations that apply in the district/city are also not comprehensive, such as the absence of obligations that must be fulfilled by the manager, the rights of fishermen along with their protection, so as not to support the realization of good governance. The obligation of the manager to conduct a tender properly must be guaranteed by regional regulations. The guarantee can be in the form of a service statement from the manager, which can be installed in a place that is easily read by the public. In fulfilling public complaints about unsatisfactory services, it is the responsibility of the manager to provide a complaint box along with operational standards for complaints settlement procedures. Completeness of sanctions as an instrument of force so that the obligations of fishermen are carried out are not found in local regulations, this results in the obligation of fishermen not to sell fish caught in TPI. On the other hand there are no guarantees for fishermen to be paid in cash for the results of the fish auction, so that managers with various reasons make concessions to fishermen and traders to transact without auctions. In conditions like this, of course the management is also unable to calculate how many and types, fish caught by fishermen. The attitude or behavior of managers to provide such concessions is certainly a bad precedent in the management of fish auctions in the TPI provided by the local government. It can be ascertained that the district/city regional government is disadvantaged in the withdrawal of regional levies. Also lost the opportunity to obtain fish production data, because the data presented now is only data taken from the number of fish participating in the auction, while those that are not auctioned cannot be counted or detected and this is the cause of the government's difficulty in building a National Fish Logistics System (SLIN).

In the context of the goal of realizing the welfare of fishermen, it turns out that the material contained in the regional regulations does not have a basic regulation to improve the welfare of fishermen, so there is no social fund, famine funds and repair funds for fishing equipment. Therefore, it is natural that fishermen are not interested in tethering their ships to the TPI port. Another fact is that there is no guarantee of legal protection for the risk of security of work, including protection of security disturbances at sea. A sense of security and risk guarantee are not obtained by fishermen, causing fishermen to be unable to pursue their work with reasonable expectations. Regarding the security and risk guarantee for fishermen, it can make fishermen's work not attractive to run so that it can result in the emergence of barriers to the empowerment of marine fisheries as marine resources that can provide welfare to the community, especially those living on the coast, both as fishermen's livelihood and as fish processing processor.

Cultural Barriers: The Obligation of Fishermen and Traders

The attitude of tolerance from managers, who always let fishermen commit violations, even allowing fishermen to sell fish outside the TPI, is an attitude that is not independent. This attitude arises not because it is based on the values of wisdom, but is a response from the culture of fishermen that is built stronger than the rules made. In this case it could happen because the regional regulation was played as social engineering (Pound, 1908). The reality is that even though the legal function can be played as social engineering, but still prioritized to protect the interests of the community, a law is needed to be played as social control, so that legal culture cannot be abandoned. This can be seen from the attitude of fishermen who do not believe the importance of TPI as a facility held to improve the welfare of fishermen.

The response from the fisherman's culture was shown before the community, the nature of acceptance or rejection of a legal provision or certain legal actions. Often the disobedience of the community is interpreted as a political problem or lack of understanding of laws and regulations, for example: low community legal awareness or non-compliance with laws and regulations. Friedman (1969) stated that legal culture has the advantage of being able to attract people's attention to values related to law and legal processes, but can be analytically distinguished by law and legal processes and often stated to be independent. So culture or legal culture is the overall attitude of the general public and values in society that will determine the opinion of the law (Friedman, 1984). Regarding the attitude of fishermen who do not implement local regulations, it does not mean that fishermen's legal awareness is relatively low or the socialization of the regulation is not yet, but rather tends to the response of fishermen to the legal provisions. In this case the legal culture has greater influence than the written provisions, so that the culture cannot be easily eliminated. So strong is the legal culture, that regional regulations cannot be effective. With respect to this situation, the legal objectives must be formulated in their legal objectives which are always in accordance and can provide support for the legal culture.

Meanwhile, the manager tolerates, as a result of his helplessness to oblige fishermen to sell auctions of fish caught in the TPI, because the culture is stronger than the written provisions of the local regulations. Likewise, traders do not carry out their obligations to pay in full the results of fish auctions, given tolerance not given sanctions, have built traders to not pay cash. This also happens because the culture is stronger than the written provisions in regional regulations. This condition is clearly the cause of the lack of a culture that supports the implementation of regional regulations. It is precisely a bad precedent that is legalized, without any fear from fishermen, traders and managers to violate local regulations. Repeated events within a long period of time, as if left unchecked, without supervision from the government, have raised suspicions of fraudulent acts committed massively by the joint manager with the authorized agency to get tribute or part of the profit from not doing the auction . If this is allowed to continue, the regional regulation will not have legal certainty. As a result, culture will not build up to believe the importance of TPI as a place that must be done by fishermen to sell their fish.

The Need for Fair and Legal Certainty Regional Regulations

Likewise, if it is reviewed from its legal system, it is likely that the regional regulation does not guarantee justice, usefulness and legal certainty. Therefore the regional regulation cannot be used as a legal system that regulates the management of fish auctions, as stated by Gustav Radbruch (2006) about the legal system that can be operationalized if it contains elements of expediency, elements of justice and elements of legal certainty (Apeldorn, 1985). The benefits must be felt by fishermen, traders and local governments. Fishermen get legal protection in obtaining a decent price of fish, guaranteed safety and risk protection in fishing. The traders obtained a guarantee of the quality of fish purchased and fulfilled their needs. The government can obtain auction fees as regional income that can be used to prosper fishermen and can run fish distribution nationally. Here, the law really must give happiness to humans. In terms of justice, the fishermen obtain services in fulfilling their living needs properly and for traders will get fish according to their needs so they can continue to run their business and the government can manage the marine resources well. Furthermore, the element of legal certainty indicated that for those who do not carry out sanctions, without exception and for those who carry out will obtain benefits and justice (Wirawan, 2018).

Meanwhile, in terms of legal certainty, the regional regulations governing the TPI must provide legal certainty of its application, so that its implementation can be guaranteed effectively. For this reason, in order to provide legal certainty, each obligation that is regulated in regional regulations must be supplemented by the sanctions applied to those who violate them. The existence of the compelling nature of the regulation influences the certainty of its enactment, thus ultimately encouraging the realization of adherence to regional regulations. Not obeying the fishermen to sell fish caught in the TPI, because there are no sanctions that can be applied to fishermen who do not carry out their obligations, so that the regulation does not contain any compelling elements, as a result, compliance cannot be developed properly.

The absence of adherence to written regional regulations shows that the law is not played as a social engineering tool, but only reinforces the role of law as social control, namely the law affirming what has happened, not making changes. The role of local regulations that regulate TPI, which is aimed at changing the behavior of fishermen to sell fish caught in TPI cannot be realized, so that the objectives of the regional regulations are not achieved. Meanwhile the living law, which has been in effect for a long time, provides more benefits, provides justice and legal certainty. For this reason, regional regulations can be implemented effectively, in addition to sanctions for violating them, but also to give a sense of justice to fishermen, traders and in their formation involve community participation.

Arrangement of Fish Auction Sites Based on Good Governance

The TPI's regulatory authority, currently based on Law Number 23 of 2014 concerning Regional Government, has changed which had previously been the authority of the provincial government, now it has become the authority of the district/city regional government. For that to refer to Law Number 12 of 2011 concerning Legal Products, the regulation is accommodated in the regency/city regulations. Based on the results of the study, in reality TPI describes several weaknesses in its management, namely:

1. The manager is disobedient in carrying out his duties in accordance with regional regulations.

2. Law enforcement against violations of the rights and obligations of fishermen and traders are not carried out consistently.

3. Supervision of the manager is not carried out effectively.

4. Protection of fishermen's risk is not accommodated in local regulations.

5. Sanctions given to fishermen as regulated in regional regulations are not carried out in an orderly manner.

Obedience of the TPI managers in carrying out their duties can be seen from the presence or absence of service announcements posted on the TPI which can be easily read by all those who are in the place. The installation of the service declaration shows the manager's promise to carry out his duties well in the form of public services and will follow up on community input on the findings of violations. In this case public services are defined as services available to the public (Roth, 1987). Therefore, public services must be part of the legal system. TPI arrangements that do not meet the legal system that can be implemented cannot be used to manage good governance.

Law enforcement against violations of the rights and obligations of fishermen and traders is not carried out consistently. For violations of the rights of fishermen, it often happens because the proceeds from the sale of the fish caught by auction are not paid in cash, but have to wait for days. Likewise the right to obtain guarantees for the risk of accidents in sailing is not guaranteed by regional regulations. Meanwhile, violations of fishermen's obligations occur because fish caught by fishermen, the sale is not carried out by auction. The same reason is always delivered because auction payments are often delayed. For fishermen who do not have enough capital, the sail will be delayed. On this issue, fishermen take shortcuts, that is, they prefer to sell outside the TPI, so they can receive payments immediately. Buying and selling that happens is usually using a bonded method with a cheaper price. This was forced to be done because fishermen were in a difficult position, namely being chased so that the fish they caught quickly avoided avoiding quality degradation and the need for fresh money for sailing costs. Such conditions make TPI managers always reason that they cannot do much, rather than fishermen facing a shortage of catches. Instead, it tolerates fishermen and traders to buy and sell outside the TPI. After all, because the limitations do not have officers who are able to supervise effectively and directly well, there is no repression of violators.

Protection of the risk of fishermen in carrying out their work is not accommodated in local regulations, making fishermen have no guarantee of protection in the event of an accident or no guarantee of life when famine. There is no guarantee of risk for fishermen, so it proves that fishermen do not get justice in getting a guarantee of a prosperous life, as expected that the law must be fair. But just fair is not enough, but it must be beneficial, namely improving the welfare of fishermen. In the end the law must contain legal certainty; therefore law enforcement must be consistent. For those who carry out it will get pleasure and for those who violate will receive sanctions. Likewise for fishermen who are bound by local regulations or laws that regulate fishermen, it should be able to provide benefits to fishermen in the form of guarantees of obtaining a reasonable selling price of fish.

The shortage of fish auction payments that occur almost every year indicates that the manager does not apply sanctions given to traders who are not willing to pay in cash. The reason fishermen do not have enough money to pay for fish purchased with an auction is always accepted by the manager. The requirement to submit deposit money as collateral for payment of cash is not applied to all TPIs, so that fishermen often find it difficult to sail according to the scheduled time, because they have to wait for reliable working capital to be collected from previous fish sales payments. Here shows that the sanctions that have been regulated in local regulations are not applied consistently, so that the regional regulations do not have legal certainty and do not have benefits for fishermen. Whereas in reality, the regional regulation cannot prosper the fishermen, even there is the impression that the regional regulation has no role in regulating the management of TPI. Therefore, an arrangement that contains legal certainty is useful and fair is needed.

Preparation of Operational Standards for TPI Procedures That Support the National Fish Logistics System

In order to realize good governance, all material content regulated in regional regulations should be formulated in standard operating procedures, which carry out the task of directing a procedure that supports the realization of the rights and obligations that have been regulated. Nowadays operational procedure standards are an obligation for each agency to develop a guideline to become a mechanism that must be passed in obtaining services. In the service of fishermen, traders and the community, it should also be applied equally by following the stages and conditions according to the established operational standard procedures, so as to narrow the opportunities of managers to discriminate services. To realize services that meet service standards and do not discriminate, regional regulations should require managers to prepare standard operating procedures that must be approved by agencies that are given the task of examining compliance with governance regulated in regional regulations. If this can be realized properly, then the services provided by the manager can increase public trust. In this case public service is public trust (Lewis & Gilman, 2005).

In accordance with the purpose of its formation, that the establishment of the TPI is not only to improve the welfare of fishermen, but also to meet the needs of fish nationally. In an effort to improve the welfare of fishermen, TPI keeps the price of fish naturally by avoiding speculative games. Whereas in an effort to meet the national fish needs, TPI records fish caught by fishermen, so that the data can be used as material for the implementation of the national fish logistics system. For this reason, in the standard operating procedures, there is also an obligation to record the stages of recording fish caught by fishermen. The recording of fish caught by fishermen by the TPI manager was reported to the distribution center to be processed into a national fish logistics system. In order to fulfill the recording, the content of regional regulations regulates the obligation for managers to record and the importance of law enforcement against fishermen who commit violations by selling fish caught outside the TPI. At the same time, operational standards for enforcement procedures are needed to be carried out in the context of law enforcement, so that there is no more omission or tolerance given to fishermen and traders who commit violations.

Conclusion

From the results of the study, it was concluded that the regency/city regulations governing the management of TPI were not effective in their implementation, which was caused by constraints, which consisted of structural factors, substance factors and cultural factors. Obstacles from structural factors occur because the implementation of regional regulations is not accompanied by law enforcement, so that there seems to be omission. Barriers to the substance factor occur because regional regulations do not provide legal protection to fishermen and traders and there are no sanctions that can be applied to violators of these regional regulations. Likewise the manager has no obligations and sanctions that can be applied in order to carry out their management properly. While barriers from cultural factors, that fishermen do not yet believe the importance of TPI as a facility held to improve the welfare of fishermen.

To overcome this, taking into account the wishes of fishermen, traders, managers and the community, local regulations are needed that fulfill the elements of benefit, elements of justice and elements of legal certainty. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a regulation model on TPI, the content of which fully regulates the rights and obligations of fishermen and traders, with good governance-based management arrangements, which apply the principle of openness/transparency, accountability, equality, so that it becomes a necessity for managers, fishermen and traders to carry it out, because it gets a benefit. In the meantime, to support the national fish logistics system, managers are given the obligation to collect data on all catched fish, so that they can be used as reference materials for fish distribution that supports the national fish logistics system. To ensure the implementation of good governance-based management and data collection of catched fish in support of the national fish logistics system, the standard operating procedures must be formulated by the TPI manager, to later be used as a guide in carrying out its work to provide good service.

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